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Abstract 
The paper explores the role of algorithms in the constitution of the social world. Concepts drawn from the 
perspectives of social phenomenology and information systems are used to argue that algorithms are 
sociomaterial constructions that, as part of algorithmic assemblages, have become embedded in the 
lifeworld of people who routinely use digital devices in their online lives. The paper argues that as these 
assemblages become more deeply embedded in the social fabric, there is pressing need for critical analysis 
because of the power and information asymmetries that are uncovered when considering the roles of the 
complex organizations that control the algorithmic assemblages that increasingly shape people’s digital 
lives.  
Keywords 
algorithms, algorithmic assemblages, lifeworld 
Introduction 
One of the defining characteristics of the last decade has been the emergence of big data as a sociotechnical 
force. Digital data are increasing at an increasing rate. This includes, for example,  the intentional and 
unintentional trace data people leave behind as they interact online and data from the internet of things. 
Online quantified data has allowed powerful actors to represent more and more of the physical and social 
world as data and metadata, a process van Dijck, (2014; 198) has called “datification.” However, big data 
are useless without algorithms, and there is a particular view of the nature and status of algorithms that 
clearly bears critical scrutiny, especially in light of the increasing importance they are playing in many 
people’s lives. 
The paper explores the role of algorithms in the constitution of the social world. Concepts drawn from the 
perspectives of social phenomenology and information systems are used to argue that algorithms are 
sociomaterial constructions that, as part of algorithmic assemblages, have become embedded in the 
lifeworld of people who routinely use digital devices in their online lives. This line of inquiry responds to 
Willson’s (2016; 11) call that 
…questions can be posed as to the broader philosophical issues raised around ontological understandings 
and experiences of the world that are engaged with and developed when the everyday is increasingly 
algorithmically articulated, or more simply, to ask how this might affect how people see and understand 
their environment and their relations. 
After a brief discussion of algorithms, the concept of an algorithmic assemblage is introduced.  This concept 
is used to describe the ways in which people, digital devices, algorithms, and the platforms and services 
they use are bound up together (Aragona, and Felaco, 2019; Lupton, 2016, Ananny, 2016, Perrotta and 
Williamson, 2016, Tanweer, Fiore-Gartland, and Aragon, 2016). Then the concept of the “lifeworld” from 
Schutz’s (1970, 1967) social phenomenology is used to explore the nature and implications of the ways in 
which algorithmic assemblages have become entangled in the work and social lives of many people. It is 
suggested that a key component of the lifeworld is the “technological frame,” (Bijker, 2010; Orlikowski and 
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Gash, 1992), a shared and taken-for-granted basis for the understanding of the nature and uses of 
technologies. This concept is used to explain the role of the myth of algorithmic neutrality in moving 
algorithmic assemblages into the background of the lifeworld. The paper concludes with an argument that 
as these assemblages become more deeply embedded in the social fabric, there is pressing need for critical 
analysis because of the power and information asymmetries that are uncovered when considering the roles 
of the complex organizations that control the algorithmic assemblages that increasingly shape people’s 
digital lives. A contribution of this paper is to provide a preliminary sketch of a conceptual framework that 
can be used to conduct such an analysis. 
Algorithms and algorithmic assemblages 
Over 2 billion people routinely use at least one social media platform, whether it is Facebook, Youtube, 
WhatsApp, Twitter, Instagram, Pandora, Spotify, Tinder or some other emerging service (Chaffey, 2019; 
Statista, 2019, Spangler, 2019a, 2019b, Palotta, 2019). A common thread running through all of this activity 
is that it is mediated by algorithms, which are becoming increasingly important in many sectors of the social 
world (Napoli, 2013, 3). According to Kitchin (2016; 2) 
… dozens of key sets of algorithms are shaping everyday practices and tasks, including those that perform 
search, secure encrypted exchange, recommendation, pattern recognition, data compression, auto-
correction, routing, predicting, profiling, simulation and optimization… 
Even serendipitous encounters with digital information are likely to be algorithmically-mediated (Sundin, 
et al. 2017; 226). The nature, extent, and effects of this mediation are not at all clear in large part because 
much of this algorithmic activity takes place in the deep background of people’s digital lives.  
Algorithms have meaning, significance, and impacts in domains outside of computer science such that 
“everything people see and do on the web is a product of algorithms” (Rainie and Anderson, 2017). The 
term “algorithm” is shorthand for an “algorithmic assemblage,” the infrastructure that supports the 
implementation, maintenance, use, and evolution of algorithms and the programs, data, and platforms of 
which they are a part. An assemblage is a useful concept to employ here because it “affords insight into the 
emergence, temporality, spatiality, distributed agency and fragility of social formations” that include a wide 
range of organizational, technical, and individual actors (Lamprou, Mitev, and Doolin, 2014; 5).  
Algorithmic assemblages as a type of digital assemblage, are “distinct patterns of ICT collections that, in 
use, are functionally equivalent and structurally similar, relying on standardised and commodified ICT and 
are neither formally designed nor collectively governed” (Sawyer, Crowston, and Wigand, 2014). They are 
relatively persistent and stable heterogeneous configurations of people, technologies, and data that come 
together to accomplish some task for a period of time (Müller and Schurr, 2016; 219).  An algorithmic 
assemblage includes the algorithm, the software, the data structures and data on which the algorithm 
operates, the computational and network infrastructure that powers the algorithmic activity, the platform 
or interface through which it is available, and the devices with which people interact with the service or 
platform that uses the algorithm (Pink, et al., 2017, 8; Ananny, 2016; 7; Kavanaugh, McGarraghy, and Kelly, 
2015; 8). There are human actors in the assemblage “debating the models, cleaning the training data, 
designing the algorithms, tuning the parameters, deciding on which algorithms to depend on in which 
context” (Gillespie, 2014a; 5). There are also the millions of people who, through their digital practices, 
enact assemblages on a daily basis. For this reason, algorithmic assemblages can best be seen as pervasive 
in social, cultural, economic, political, and cultural domains, or, stated more succinctly, as embedded in 
everyday life (Willson, 2016; 5; Matzner, 2019; 126; Berg, 2014: 1). For the purposes at hand, this concept 
is useful, because it describes large, dynamic, and heterogeneous configurations of technology, people, and 
data that cross organizational boundaries while keeping the focus on the role of algorithms in the 
assemblage. In this sense, algorithmic assemblages can be seen as an interesting subordinate concept within 
the broader concept of information systems. 
An algorithmic assemblage is always “in play;” with “movement and the temporary, socially, materially and 
discursively accomplished ‘coming-together’ of heterogeneous entities into social practices” (Lamprou, 
Mitev, and Doolin, 2014; 1). It is characterized by entanglements involving its various components, the 
discourses competing to define it, and the organizations that compete to control it (Pink, Lanzeni and Horst, 
2018; 2). Components of the assemblage change as people interact within it and with each other. However, 
over time algorithmic assemblage can adapt to changing conditions, moving towards a relatively stable, 
functional equilibrium even as it is evolving (Sawyer, Crowston, and, Wiegand, 2014; 52).  
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When a person uses a search engine or a social media platform through her smartphone or other digital 
device, she is interacting at one terminus of an algorithmic assemblage which is instantiated in a material 
and performative sense “as a running system, running in a particular place, on a particular computer, 
connected to a particular network, with a particular hardware configuration;” as she examines the results 
of her search, her “experience of algorithms can change as infrastructure changes” (Dourish, 2016; 5, 6). 
The assemblage operates largely without the need for human intervention, except for the end user, as it 
carries out the tasks and processes necessary to provide a response (Willson; 2016; 3). This activity, while 
technically sophisticated, is, in fact, a routine social practice and a mundane and mostly invisible part of 
daily life (Sundin, et al., 2017; 225). Algorithmic assemblages therefore have social functions, one of the 
more important of which is routinely establishing, shaping, and influencing a range of formal and informal 
social relations across time and space (Busco, 2009; 254). 
An algorithmic assemblage is a socio-material accomplishment and a communication technology, 
connecting people, companies, governments, and other actors in an ongoing exchange of data, information, 
and services. Its effects emerge when it is used and this performative enactment involves the whole of the 
assemblage because “the conditions and consequences of algorithmic rules only come into being through 
the careful plaiting of relatively unstable associations of people, things, processes, documents and 
resources” (Neyland and Mollers, 2016; 1). This becomes important because, as they become embedded in 
people’s social practices, these assemblages impact the lives of the people who routinely use them in ways 
that are both significant and difficult to foreground.. One factor that contributes to the cloaking of 
algorithmic assemblages is the myth of algorithmic neutrality. 
The myth of algorithmic neutrality 
Over time, algorithmic assemblages can shift from the background to the forefront of people’s attention. In 
general, algorithmically mediated activity tends to be foregrounded when there is a breakdown, as when 
Facebook researchers’ experimental manipulation of news feeds became public in 2014 after the results 
were published as an academic paper.  This type of incident brings the potential impacts of algorithms to 
widespread attention, but the resulting scrutiny tends to be short-lived. The return to normalcy is hastened 
by the relative invisibility and inscrutability of the assemblage and because of a myth that has defined 
algorithms as objective, neutral, authoritative, and benign. 
What is the myth of algorithmic neutrality? According to Lustig and Nardi (2015; 743) algorithms “are 
simultaneously a set of abstract instructions (logic) and possibilities for action (control).” It is then a 
sensible inference that algorithms are largely neutral in terms of the ways in which they process data. They 
are seen to operate autonomously without the need for human intervention and have social and technical 
significance without being well understood by the general population of end users (Willson, 2016; 3; Seaver, 
2017; 2; Rader and Gray, 2015; 173). When algorithms move from the computer scientist's machine to 
commercial application they are seen as “strictly rational concerns, marrying the certainties of mathematics 
with the objectivity of technology” (Seaver, 2013; 2). They make it easier to find information, conduct the 
routine tasks of daily life, get work done, maintain social relationships, enable complex decisions, and 
engage with many institutional and individual actors. These are some of the main tropes that constitute the 
myth of algorithmic neutrality and authority. In this view of the social life of algorithms, they are tools that 
improve people’s lives, reducing the friction in many different types of online activities. 
Reinforcing this view, algorithms are often described by the companies and organizations that own and/or 
employ them as trusted tools that provide fair and objective results free from bias, influence and error. 
Their output is seen as a technical resource that can facilitate consumer behavior (Willson, 2014; 5). In 
addition to providing a seemingly reasonable way for people to grasp the nature of algorithms, this myth 
serves another purpose. As “a carefully crafted fiction” it establishes the legitimacy of algorithms, the 
assemblage, and, by inference, of the company or organization that owns and/or uses them (Gillespie, 
2014a, 14). When this myth is perceived as reasonable and persuasive, the provider of the assemblage is 
seen as a trusted and neutral actor and the social life of the algorithm as a benign entity is maintained. The 
more that this quality of algorithmic neutrality can be asserted and accepted, the more easily the claim can 
be made that the work of the algorithm is the result of the machine and not of humans and their subjectivity. 
A consequence is that the output of algorithmic assemblages is seen as reasonable and expected (Ananny, 
2016; 11). 
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This myth is a “technological frame” (Lin, 2005; Bijker, 2001, 1997; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994, 1992) that 
includes the “the knowledge and expectations that guide actors’ interpretations and actions related to” an 
information technology artifact (Davidson, 2006; 24). This frame provides a narrative about a technology 
and shapes people’s understandings about the conditions under which and ways in which it should be used, 
and the intended consequences of use. Technological frames are important because they are keys to 
understanding the ways in which people use technologies (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994; 175).  The myth of 
algorithmic neutrality, then, is a set of beliefs about a technological artifact, in this case an algorithmic 
assemblage, articulated and maintained in the public discourse by stakeholders with a vested interest in the 
successful, profitable, and continued use of the tools, platforms, and services enabled by their algorithms. 
How this frame is maintained “depends not just on its design but also on the mundane realities of news 
cycles, press releases, tech blogs, fan discussion, user rebellion, and the machinations of their competitors” 
(Gillespie, 2014b; 16). Technological frames play a significant role in maintaining the myth and helping 
algorithmic assemblages recede into the background of daily life. 
Therefore, outside the world of computer scientists and others who study digital technologies, algorithmic 
assemblages are not typically in the foreground of most people’s attention. While knowing that algorithms 
exist, for many people, they are inside a classic black box and “pass us by without being noticed” (Beer, 
2016; 2). There is comfort provided, however, by algorithmic objectivity which refers to the framing of the 
algorithm (and the assemblage of which it is a part) as impartial and unbiased, in large part because of its 
status as a complex technical artifact; done well, this frame can be maintained in times of controversy 
(Gillespie, 2014b; 2). The results of algorithmic activity, then, can be described by the provider of the tool, 
platform, or service that uses the algorithm as having “a powerful legitimacy, much the way statistical data 
bolsters scientific claims, with the human hands yet another step removed” (Gillespie, 2014a, 7). In fact, the 
pervasiveness and taken-for-grantedness of this myth helps algorithmic assemblages recede into the 
background where they operate quietly, efficiently, continually, and relatively unobtrusively in people’s 
digital lives as they routinely carry out a range of algorithmically-mediated activities.  
Beer (2016; 2) suggests that researchers “need to think about the powerful ways in which notions and ideas 
about the algorithm circulate through the social world.” Algorithmic assemblages are not simply the lines 
of code that define algorithms, the infrastructure that makes them work, and the people who maintain and 
use them. They are “‘large’ spanning time and space, but ... also ‘small’ coming in contact with routine and 
everyday practice” (Bowker, Baker, Millerand, and Ribes, 2009; 113). This latter insight is discussed in the 
next section. 
Algorithmic assemblages and the lifeworld 
The lifeworld, a concept taken from Schutz’s social phenomenology (1967), describes the world that is 
given, self-evident, and experienced as shared. Schulz, in turn, borrowed the concept from Husserl (1913, 
1936), who described the lifeworld as the world that we experience in a taken-for-granted way in our “pre 
and extra-scientific” lives. This world is practical and temporally dynamic, while also grounded in a 
structural certainty that that make possible double, the key to his version or phenomenology. For Husserl, 
the lifeworld was the starting point for his method of phenomenological doubt; in pursuit of the essences 
of things, the lifeworld was to be transcended (Muzetto, 2015, 261 Butnaru, 2015; 69; Yudin, 2016; 12, 
Vaitkus, 2005, 98). For Schutz, however, the lifeworld is not a realm to be transcended, it is the object of 
study. With this move, he socialized the lifeworld, leading Gurwitsch (1962, 51) to claim that  
 
One of Schutz's original contributions consists in his contention that the social character belongs to the 
life-world essentially and intrinsically. That world is a social and intersubjective world from the outset 
and throughout; it does not become so subsequently, as was maintained in a certain sense by Husserl 
In the lifeworld we engage in many routine, repetitive, and mundane activities that become the contours of 
our social and organizational lives; of interest are those activities that involve interactions with and within 
algorithmic assemblages. As people make greater and more intensive uses of their digital devices and 
conduct more of their routine interactions online, more of the data and information that they consume are 
algorithmically curated (Rader and Gray, 2015; 173). An algorithmic assemblage is an “‘always on’ 
technology that follows users on smartphones, reacting to unread emails, examining never-ending social 
media newsfeeds, and constantly adapting new information in order to refine our digital dossiers” (Hess, 
2014; 10). 
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The social phenomenological framework makes clear that the more people use digital devices to engage 
with algorithmically-driven online platforms and services, the more the assemblages of which these are a 
part become embedded in the lifeworld. Feenberg (2015; 230) describes this state of affairs as ontological, 
arguing that technological artifacts are as fundamental to social reality as are language and culture. While 
the form and function of technologies change over time and across societies, they are always present. As a 
complex form of technology, an algorithmic assemblage does not “transcend the lifeworld but rather forms 
a special part of it” (Feenberg, 2015; 234). As people use and integrate technologies into their lives, they 
develop routines and patterns of experience that shape their interactions with their devices and with the 
lifeworld. These patterns are “embodiment relations,” meaning that the artifact (Brey, 2000; 3) 
does not, or hardly, become itself an object of perception. Rather, it 'withdraws' and serves as a (partially) 
transparent means through which one perceives one's environment, thus engendering a partial symbiosis 
of oneself and it. 
As a consequence, the artifacts and the assemblages of which they are a part become a means by which 
people carry out their projects and tasks and, as the assemblages withdraw, they become extensions of the 
person. For example, a smartphone is a technical artifact in the lifeworld and a transparent and powerful 
means by which the lifeworld of the person using it is shaped. There is a technological frame that people 
use to make sense of the artifact (and the assemblage) and, in turn, the “technologies themselves co-
constitute narratives and our understanding of these narratives by configuring characters and events in a 
meaningful temporal whole” (Coeckelbergh and Reijers, 2016; 325). This is particularly the case when the 
technologies have significant textuality (the smartphone as opposed to a hammer), because they provide 
people with easy ways to engage in sustained social interactions (Coeckelbergh and Reijers, 2016; 344). 
Through the smartphone, the person enacts an assemblage to search, to engage with social media or 
perform some online task; the resulting co-constituted narrative reinforces a technological frame 
(Davidson, 2006; 24), providing the person with an understanding of the assemblage characterized by 
beliefs in algorithmic authority, objectivity, and neutrality.  
In this way, algorithmic assemblages become increasingly important in shaping the lifeworld. This is 
because, over time, as people routinely enact these assemblages, algorithmic logic comes to shape and 
control the data and information flows on which people depend and incorporate into many of their routine 
activities. This is the feedback loop of datafication wherein the assemblage is “not only … collecting and 
analysing data about Internet users, but also as feeding such data back to users, enabling them to orient 
themselves in the world” (Kennedy, Poell, and van Dijck, 2015; 1). Algorithmic assemblages produce and 
certify knowledge making them powerful actors in the paramount reality of the lifeworld, the world of 
working (Gillespie, 2014a; 2). For this reason, the material and social world people produce and reproduce 
is shot through with the output of algorithmic assemblages (Eberle, 2012, 295). Accepting the technological 
frame of algorithmic neutrality, people domesticate algorithmic assemblages, bringing them into their 
homes and workplaces where they become a taken-for-granted part of people’s routines. 
Algorithmic assemblages are “built to be embedded into practice in the lived world that produces the 
information they process, and in the lived world of their users” (Gillespie, 2014a; 17). As people 
performatively enact it, an increasingly common outcome of engagement with these assemblages is that 
decisions about the relevance of information are being made through technical means that have 
epistemological consequences; they restrict the domain of what can be known, provide a means by which 
what is in the domain can be known, and influence the ways in which what is known can be used (Gillespie, 
2014b; 1). They “help to bring about particular ways of seeing the world, reproduce stereotypes, reify 
practices … and world views, restrict choices or open possibilities previously unidentified” (Willson, 2016; 
5). In so doing, algorithmic assemblages shape the lifeworld in ways that are hidden and deeply entangled 
in people’s social and work lives and in their routine information and decision-making practices. 
As people interact with these algorithmic assemblages, they are also interacting with the powerful 
institutions and organizations that own and/or implement the algorithms. Although there are relationships 
of mutual shaping that are unintended consequences of these ongoing interactions, there are also distinct 
and powerful asymmetries at work. This is not without consequence because, over time, people begin to 
adjust their social actions and interactions in ways that “suit the algorithm they depend on” thereby, in a 
sense, making themselves algorithmically available and recognizable (Gillespie, 2014a; 2; 2016; 64). In 
terms of the bidirectional relationship between people and technology, this type of adjustment illustrates 
the material agency of the algorithmic assemblage which can take on gatekeeping and decision support 
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functions through control of the information flow to the individual, shaping the person’s information life 
(Napoli, 2013; 8; Musiani, 2013; 1; Beer, 2009; 994). Gillespie (2014b; 21) describes the potential impacts 
of the increasing presence of algorithmic assemblage in the lifeworld: 
It is easy to theorize, but substantially more difficult to document, how users may shift their world views 
to accommodate the underlying logics and implicit presumptions of the algorithms they use regularly. 
There is a case to be made that the working logics of these algorithms not only shape user practices, but 
lead users to internalize their norms and priorities. 
A critical analysis of the myth of algorithmic neutrality and the asymmetries of algorithmic assemblages is 
needed because it “might well reveal something of the wider political dynamics of which they are a part” 
(Beer, 2016; 9). 
Conclusion 
As Dourish (2016; 1) points out, “[w]hen digital processes become more visible as elements that shape our 
experience, then algorithms in particular become part of the conversation about how our lives are 
organized.” Willson (2016; 2) argues, “[s]tudies of the everyday are … partly concerned with rendering the 
seemingly invisible visible and thereby open to critique and the examination of power relations and 
practices that are in play.” This paper argues that algorithmically mediated interactions are becoming 
increasingly important in many people’s lives. When using online services and platforms for search, 
entertainment and other activities, they are actually interacting with and within algorithmic assemblages.  
This routine activity, in a performative sense, brings assemblages to life as people, through their digital 
devices enact and become part of algorithmic assemblages. However, as these interactions become more 
habitual, the assemblage fades from view, becoming hidden in daily life. To understand why and how this 
happens, social phenomenology is proposed as a conceptual framework to pull back the curtain on these 
assemblages. This framework is particularly apposite because ““relevance of phenomenology to the 
understanding of the social impact of communications technology, particularly the internet, has aroused 
the interest of many scholars” (Zhao, 2007; 140). A contribution of this paper is to provide an initial sketch 
of conceptual framework to explore the processes by which algorithmic assemblages play a role in 
organizing people’s lives and can open these assemblages, their inherent asymmetries, and the myth of 
algorithmic neutrality and authority to sustained critique. 
The concepts of the lifeworld, where the assemblages are embedded, and technological frames, which is 
how people think about these assemblages, are keys to understanding both the invisibility and power of 
assemblages. In the lifeworld, a pervasive and persuasive technological frame that is maintained in the 
public discourse about algorithms is a major part of the knowledge of acquaintance people have about 
algorithms and the assemblages of which they are apart. With these concepts, it becomes possible to account 
for the cloaking of algorithmic assemblages through widespread acceptance of a technological frame that 
encompasses the myth of algorithmic neutrality and a belief in algorithmic authority. As people use their 
digital devices to engage in algorithmically mediated activities in more parts of their social and work lives, 
the algorithmic assemblages that they enact become less visible and more significant. It is also possible to 
use these concepts to critically examine the ways in which technological frames shape understanding of 
assemblages. This matters because the back end of these assemblages is controlled by powerful corporate 
actors who take full advantage of the data and information asymmetries that exist in these assemblages. 
The lifeworld, is being influenced and shaped by the agendas of these corporate actors in ways that are 
difficult to see. 
This framework suggests three avenues of investigation. First, is the micro level study of the ways in which 
individuals are immersed in algorithmic assemblages and how their interactions with algorithms shape 
their natural attitudes. This is in keeping with Couldry and Powell’s (2014; 2) call for “a more open inquiry 
into what actual social actors, and groups of actors, are doing” when engaging in algorithmically mediated 
interactions” An intriguing avenue for research is opened up by the “broken data” metaphor, which focuses 
on how people engage with data in mundane settings (Pink, Ruckenstein, Willim, and Duque, 2018; 11) 
offer; this approach assumes data have materiality and can be broken and repaired as people carry out their 
algorithmically mediated activities. Second, is the study of the structure and functioning of algorithmic 
assemblages, which can take advantage of the methods used in infrastructure studies. Kitchin, (2016; 13) 
argues that a “way to undertake such research is to conduct ethnographies of how people engage with and 
are conditioned by algorithmic systems and how such systems reshape how organisations conduct their 
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endeavours and are structured.” Third, is the critical study of the power and information asymmetries 
inherent in algorithmic assemblages. An example of this approach is Striphas' (2015; 408) critical 
evaluation of algorithmic culture which argues that there has been an entanglement of digital technologies, 
discourse, big data analytics and political economy, raising the specter of the privatization and algorithmic 
automation of cultural decision-making. This could also involve an investigation of the organizations in 
whose platforms and services algorithms are enacted. 
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